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ERISA PREEMPTION AND INDIRECT REGULATION OF
EMPLOYEE WELFARE PLANS THROUGH STATE
INSURANCE LAWS
INTRODUCTION
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),'
enacted to correct widespread abuses2 in the area of employee benefit plans,8
imposes federal minimum standards for plan reporting and disclosure, vest-
ing, funding, and fiduciary responsibilities.4  To ensure national uniformity,5
section 514 preempts state laws that "relate to" employee benefit plans.0
Since ERISA affects many areas traditionally governed by state law,7 the
extent to which states may continue to regulate certain activities whenever
such regulation "relate[s] to" employee benefit plans has been the subject
of much litigation.8
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976))
[hereinafter cited as ERISA § -].
2. After twelve years of investigation into various abuses of employee pension and welfare
plans that had deprived many workers of their earned benefits, see 120 CoNG. REc. 29,934(1974), Congress enacted ERISA to replace the Welfare and Pensions Plans Disclosure Act,
Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958), which had proven ineffective due to weak disclosure
requirements and an even weaker enforcement mechanism. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, 93d Cong,,
2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & A .Nnws 4639, 4642; S. REP. No. 93-127,
92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 4838, 4841; S. REP. No.
1150, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972). For a discussion of the evolution of the federal legislation
governing employee benefit plans, see Chadwick & Foster, Federal Regulation of Retire-
ment Plans: The Quest for Parity, 28 VANs. L. REv. 641, 642-68 (1975); Snyder, Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 11 WAKE FORESr L. REv. 219, 226-46 (1975).
3. The term "employee benefit plan," ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3), includes any
fund or program maintained by an employer, an employee organization, or both, that provides
medical, disability, or certain other benefits through the purchase of insurance or otherwise
(an "employee welfare benefit plan," ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1976)), or that
provides retirement income to employees (an "employee pension benefit plan," ERISA § 3(2),
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1976)).
4. Title I of ERISA, §§ 1-514, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144 (1976), is divided into five parts.
Part one applies reporting and disclosure requirements to both pension and welfare plans.
Part two, creating minimum vesting standards, and part three, reltating to funding requirements,
apply only to employee pension benefit plans. Part four establishes a "prudent man" fiduciary
standard for the administrators of all employee benefit plans, and part five provides for civil
and criminal penalties for violation of the statute and grants various administrative powers to
the Departments of Labor and the Treasury.
Title 11 of ERISA, §§ 1001-2008, includes amendments to the Internal Revenue Code that
relate to employee pension plans. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 410-415. Title III, ELISA §§ 3001-3043, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1201-1242 (1976), defines the jurisdiction of the Departments of Labor and the
Treasury, and title IV, §§ 4001-82, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-81 (1976), establishes the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation to protect pension plan beneficiaries in the event that the plan's
funding is inadequate.
For a more detailed description of title I, see Brummond, Federal Preemption of State
Insurance Regulation Under ERISA, 62 IowA L. REv. 57, 61-63 (1976). For a discussion of
the scope of the other titles, see Chadwick & Foster, supra note 2, at 671-81; Note, The Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: Policies and Problems, 26 SYRAcUsn L. Riv.
539, 549-54 (1975).
5. See 120 CONG. Rc. 29,933 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams); 120 CoNG. RPc.
29,197 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dent).
6. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976).
7. See note 78 and accompanying text infra.
8. See, e.g., Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.
1977) (state regulation of insurers); Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (ist Cir. 1977),
ERISA PREEMPTION
The scope of ERISA's preemption of state law is delineated in three sub-
sections of the statute. Section 514(a) provides that all state laws9 are
superseded by titles I and IV of ERISA10 insofar as they "relate to" employee
benefit plans"' This sweeping language is modified by the saving clause of
section 514(b) (2) (A), which exempts state laws regulating insurance, bank-
ing, and securities from the scope of section 514(a).12 The saving clause
is in turn limited by section 514(b) (2) (B), which provides that no employee
benefit plan shall be "deemed" by a state to be an insurance company, bank,
investment company, or engaged in those businesses for the purpose of any
state laws regulating those areas.13
The statutory scheme thus excludes from preemption most state
regulation of the insurance industry. 14 However, state laws directly regu-
lating insurance may have an indirect,15 yet profound impact on the
terms and costs of employee benefit plans. 6 For example, a state law may
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978) (insurance companies); Standard Oil v. Agsalud, 442
F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (health care plans); In re C.D. Moyer Co. Trust Fund,
441 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (trusts); Old Stone Bank v. Michaelson, 439 F. Supp.
252 (D.R.L 1977) (banks); Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan.
1977) (insurers); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd
per curlai, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. CL 108 (1978) (state regulation of
health care plans); Insurers' Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn.
1976) (insurance companies); Azzaro v. Harnett, 414 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), afJ'd,
553 F.2d 93 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977) (pension funds).
9. ERISA § 514(c) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c) (1) (1976), defines "state law" as "all laws,
decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any State."
Under id. § 514(c) (2), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c) (2) (1976), "state" includes: "a State, any political
subdivisions thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate,
directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this
title.
10. See note 4 supra.
11. ERISA § 514 (a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976), provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this title and
title IV shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) and not exempt under
section 4(b).
12. Id. § 514 (b) (2) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2) (A) (1976), provides:
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be con-
strued to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates
insurance, banking, or securities.
13. Id. § 514 (b) (2) (B), § 1144(b) (2) (B) (1976), provides:
Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) of this title . . . nor any
trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or
other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the
business of insurance or banking for the purpose of any law of any State purporting
to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or in-
vestment companies.
14. See note 12 supra. The special status of state insurance laws is also evident in the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976), which provides:
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . .
unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance ....
This language is implicitly reaffirmed by § 514(d) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1976),
which provides that ERISA does not alter existing federal law. See note 26 infra.
15. "Indirect regulation," as used in this Comment, refers to those laws, not specifically
directed to employee benefit plans, which have the unavoidable effect of altering the conduct
or terms of the plan.
16. Employee welfare plans may secure insurance in three different ways. First, group
insurance policies may be purchased from private insurance companies. A second method is
self-insurance, in which the plan assumes the risk of loss by setting aside funds to pay for
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require that insurance policies issued to employee welfare plans17 provide
coverage for specified disabilities, and thus indirectly impose additional bur-
dens on the plans themselves.
This Comment considers whether the preemption provisions of ERISA
cover state insurance laws that indirectly regulate employee welfare plans.1 8
The Comment focuses on the approach to the problem taken by the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Wadsworth v. Whaland,0
and concludes that, absent statutory reform, the best solution would be to
construe ERISA as preempting state insurance laws only in those areas
specifically regulated by the Act.
I. PREEMPTION OF STATE LAws UNDER SECTION 514
A. The First Circuit's Approach in Wadsworth v. Whaland
The Whaland case illustrates the principal issues raised by state insurance
laws that indirectly regulate employee benefit plans. New Hampshire en-
acted a statute mandating that group insurance policies, including those issued
to employee welfare plans, include coverage for emotional disorders.20 Ad-
ministrators of various employee welfare plans challenged the statute, alleg-
ing that its indirect regulation of the plans violated the preemption provisions
of ERISA. The district court found that ERISA's legislative history failed
to address the issue of preemption of substantive insurance statutes. The
court, however, essentially viewed ERISA as regulating the reporting and
funding requirements for employee welfare plans and thus concluded that
section 514(a) preempted only those areas specifically regulated by the Act.2 '
specified expenses incurred by plan beneficiaries. Finally, a plan may contract with a health
maintenance organization (HMO) or other professional group to provide direct care for plan
beneficiaries. For a thorough discussion of the theory of insurance as it relates to employee
welfare benefit plans, see Brummond, supra note 4, at 67-79.
The question, crucial to ERISA preemption analysis, of who is the insurer in these arrange-
ments depends upon who has assumed the risk. See generally ESSAYS N THE TmEORY O1 RIsIC
AND INSURANCE 149 (ID. Hammond ed. 1968); PL M m & . CAm CsK, PRINCIPLBS o IN-
suzANcE 17 (5th ed. 1972). A plan that engages in self-insurance is itself the insurer be-
cause it bears the risk of loss. When a plan obtains coverage from an insurance company
or HMO, those entities bear the risk, and are therefore the insurers.
17. The term "employee welfare plan" will be used throughout this Comment to denote
employee welfare benefit plans as defined at ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1976).
See note 3 supra.
18. Although this Comment focuses on the ways in which state insurance law may affect
employee welfare plans, much of the analysis is equally applicable to the preemption of state
banking and securities laws under ERISA.
19. 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1044 (1978).
20. N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 415:18-a, 419:5-a, 420:5-a (Supp. 1977). In particular, the
New Hampshire statute considered in Whaland required:
Each insurer that issues or renews any policy of group or blanket accident or health
insurance providing benefits for medical or hospital expenses, shall provide to each
group, or to the portion of each group comprised of certificate holders of such in-
surance who are residents of this state and whose principal place of employment is
in this state, coverage for expenses arising from the treatment of mental illnesses and
emotional disorders ....
21. Dawson v. Whaland, No. 76-266 (D.N.H. Feb. 11, 1977) (available on Lexis), aff'd
sub nom. Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (Ist Cir. 1977). Although the court never
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Since the New Hampshire statute did not regulate substantive areas governed
by ERISA, preemption was denied.
On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the holding below, but advanced a
different rationale. The court characterized the New Hampshire statute as
an insurance law regulating insurers, and found that the employee welfare
plans were insureds, and therefore not insurers directly regulated by the state
law.22 The court concluded that section 514(b) (2) (B)-the "deemer" pro-
vision of ERISA 23---did not prohibit states from indirectly affecting employee
welfare plans by regulating the contents of group insurance policies.24 Rely-
ing upon the "national policy of state primacy in the regulation of insurance,
reflected in ERISA's saving clause for state insurance laws 25 and on section
514(d) of the Act, which preserves federal law26 and implicitly reafirms
the McCarran-Ferguson Act,27 the court held that the state statute was not
preempted by ERISA.28
explicitly stated that preemption was limited to those areas regulated by ERISA, it strongly
implied this conclusion. Id. n.2. To bolster its holding that the state statute was not preempted
by § 514, the court reasoned that because ERISA was not primarily concerned with the regula-
tion of insurance, the McCarran-Ferguson Act prevented preemption. See note 14 supra.
22. 562 F.2d at 76. The plans, as purchasers of insurance policies, had shifted the risk
of loss to private insurance companies, who were the "insurers" in this case. Since the plan
had paid a set premium in exchange for the insurance company's agreement to pay an un-
determined number of claims, the insurance company bore the risk of loss. See note 16 supra.
23. See note 13 supra.
24. 562 F.2d at 78. This conclusion implicitly answers in the negative the question,
raised under traditional preemption analysis, of whether the state law "conflicts or interferes"
with the federal statute. To make this determination, courts typically analyze whether the
state law obstructs the operation of the federal law. See Note, The Preemption Doctrine:
Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUm. L. REv. 623, 626 (1975).
The question of whether Congress intended to occupy the entire field that it was regulating,
to the exclusion of any state laws on the subject, represents the second strand of traditional
preemption analysis. To answer this question, a court considers whether the statute expressly
bars state regulation of a subject; whether the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive that
it leaves no room for state regulation; whether the statute touches a field in which the federal
interest is so great that state law cannot be permitted to operate; and whether the federal law
governs a field in which the need for national uniformity is so great that divergent state laws
cannot be tolerated. See Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 ILL. L.F.
515, 529-31.
It is unclear why neither the Whaland court nor most other courts, see note 8 supra, have
employed judicially developed federal standards of preemption when analyzing ERISA. This
failure may reflect a belief that these standards should not be invoked where Congress has
explicitly expressed its intention to preempt through a statute. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977) (congressional intent to preempt state laws must be found where
Congress's command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its
structure and purpose).
25. 562 F.2d at 78; see text accompanying note 32 infra. The court found that Congress
was aware of the relation of employee benefit plans to insurance, as evidenced by its definition
of "employee welfare benefit plan," and nonetheless exempted state insurance laws from pre-
emption. Id.
26. ERISA § 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1976), provides: "Nothing in this subchapter
shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair or supersede any law of the
United States. . .or any rule or regulation issued under any such law."
27. See note 14 supra.
28. The court of appeals also rejected a commerce clause challenge to the New Hampshire
statute, finding that Congress had intended to leave the regulation of insurance to the states.
562 F.2d at 79. Noting that Congress has the power to decline to protect interstate com-
merce, the court held that Congress had intended that the states regulate insurance, as evi-




Textual analysis of the preemption section of ERISA supports the First
Circuit's finding that the Act permits indirect state regulation of employee
benefit plans. The structure of section 514 suggests great deference on the
part of Congress to state insurance regulation: the sweeping preemption of
state law is followed by a broad exception for state insurance laws, with one
limited qualification. The statute also reaffirms all federal laws, including
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which upholds the primacy of the states' role
in regulating insurance. 29 In addition, Congress provided that the provisions
of titles I and IV supersede state law,30 indicating that it intended to preempt
only those state laws that conflict with the limited areas regulated by these
two titles.81
Further support for the First Circuit's holding in Whaland may be
gleaned from a careful reading of section 514, which indicates that state in-
surance laws are preempted only when the employee welfare plan is "deemed"
to be an insurer under state law. Section 514(b) (2) (B), the single excep-
tion to the saving clause, prevents regulation of employee benefit plans under
state insurance laws that "deem" such plans to be engaged in the business
of insurance. The provision, however, does not mention the status of state
insurance laws that do not "deem" employee welfare plans to be insurers but
nonetheless regulate other insurers who provide coverage for the plans. Pre-
sumably, such insurance laws could continue in effect under the protection
of the saving clause.32 Indeed, section 514(b) (2) (B) seems aimed solely at
preventing states from regulating employee welfare plans by calling them in-
surers and taking advantage of the exemption from preemption under section
514(a). The language of the deemer clause deals only with this particular
type of subterfuge, and it is difficult to read in a prohibition against all in-
direct regulation of employee benefit plans in light of its apparently limited
purpose.
Finally, as the court of appeals noted in Whaland, to interpret section
514 to forbid indirect regulation of employee welfare plans by state insurance
laws would emasculate the saving clause.83 Insurance laws that do not "re-
late to" employee welfare plans are clearly not affected by the preemption
language of section 514(a) and therefore do not need the protection of the
saving clause. Correspondingly, direct regulation of employee welfare plans
29. See note 14 supra.
30. See note 11 supra.
31. Had Congress intended otherwise, it might easily have provided: "the provisions of
this Act shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they relate to employee benefit
plans." See Brummond, supra note 4, at 125 (suggesting language that preempts state law
only insofar as such laws conflict with the sections of ERISA). But see note 43 and accom-
panying text infra. Although the district court found that preemption was limited to those
areas that Congress regulated, Dawson v. Whaland, No. 76-266 (D.N.I. Feb. 11, 1977)
(available on Lexis), the court of appeals did not address this argument, instead preferring a
textual argument, Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 75-78 (1st Cir. 1977). See note 21
and accompanying text supra.
32. See note 12 supra.
33. 562 F.2d at 78.
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by state insurance laws is forbidden by section 5 14(b) (2) (B). Thus, for
the saving clause to have meaning, section 514 must permit state insurance
laws indirectly to affect employee welfare plans. Otherwise, no insurance
laws affected by ERISA are preserved under section 514(b) (2) (A).
Textual arguments against the Whaland court's conclusions appear, upon
close analysis, to have little merit. Since the definition of "state" includes
a political subdivision that purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, em-
ployee benefit plans, it could be argued that Congress intended to preempt
indirect regulation of such plans.3 4  The word "state" appears in both the
preemption section and in the exemption to it, however, indicating that while
indirect regulation by most "state" laws is preempted, indirect regulation by
"state" insurance laws is not.3 5 Similarly, the inclusion, in ERISA's defini-
tion of "state," of entities that regulate the terms and conditions of employee
benefit plans,36 might be read to support preemption of state-imposed in-
surance benefits. Specifically, it could be argued that preemption of state-
mandated benefits was required under section 514(a) since such require-
ments arguably constitute "conditions" of an employee benefit plan. 7 None-
theless, the response to this argument resembles the earlier one-even if
"terms and conditions" should be construed broadly,38 their sweeping pre-
emption under section 514(a) results in an equally broad exemption for the
terms and conditions of state insurance laws under the saving clause.
A somewhat more plausible argument against the Whaland court's con-
clusions may be made from the text of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. While
both -the district court and the court of appeals relied upon the implicit
reaffirmation of the McCarran-Ferguson Act in section 514(d),3 9 that Act
could also support a finding of sweeping preemption. The McCarran-Fergu-
son Act does not permit federal law to supersede any state insurance law
unless the federal act "specifically relates to" the business of insurance.40
Proponents of the view that ERISA also preempts indirect regulation of em-
ployee welfare plans could argue that ERISA "specifically relates to" the
business of insurance because it preempts insurance law. The First Circuit
apparently believed that ERISA does not specifically relate to the business
of insurance, however, and that the McCarran-Ferguson Act therefore pro-
hibits the preemption of state insurance laws by ERISA.4 1
34. See note 9 supra. The Whaland court rejected this argument made by the plaintiffs,
562 F.2d at 78, using somewhat different reasoning. See notes 49-51 infra.
35. See notes 11-12 supra.
36. See note 9 supra.
37. This argument was made in the ERISA Industry Committee's (ERIC) brief in
Whaland, Brief Amicus Curiae of the ERISA Industry Committee at 10, Wadsworth v.
Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), but was not considered by the court.
38. The words "terms and conditions" are quite ambiguous, and while they may be read
broadly to include types of medical coverage afforded plan beneficiaries, they may simply in-
elude the terms and conditions covered by ERISA.
39. See note 21; text accompanying note 27 supra.
40. See note 14 supra.
41. 562 F.2d at 78 & n.41. The court never articulated its basis for finding that ERISA
did not meet the terms of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The district court, on the other hand,




The legislative history of section 514 does little to clarify the intent of
Congress with regard to indirect regulation of employee welfare plans through
state insurance laws. Instead, it indicates that Congress neither understood
nor considered the broader implications of preemption.4 Earlier versions
of the House and Senate preemption sections provided that federal law would
supersede state law only in those areas specifically regulated by ERISA.48
The conference committee deleted the language limiting preemption to areas
governed by ERISA-thereby significantly expanding the scope of preemp-
tion4 4 -but gave no meaningful explanation for the change.46
The debates preceding the enactment of the conference committee's
version of the bill indicate that preemption of all state laws relating to em-
ployee benefit plans was intended-whether or not ERISA also regulated the
activity.4 6 These debates, however, fail to clarify whether Congress intended
to preempt indirect as well as direct state regulation of these plans. For
example, Representative John Dent simply noted "what is to many the crown-
because ERISA "is not primarily concerned with the regulation of insurance." Dawson v.
Whaland, No. 76-266 (D.N.H. Feb. 11, 1977) (available on Lexis) (emphasis supplied). In
reaching this conclusion, the court noted that ERISA deals almost entirely with reporting
provisions and various aspects of retirement funds. This "primarily concerned with" test is
obviously more stringent than the "specifically relates to" language of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, and would seem to misdirect the analysis by considering the extent of an act's concern
with insurance, rather than the directness of its regulation of the area.
42. The language of the final version of § 514 was a radical departure from earlier formu-
lations, see text accompanying note 44 infra, and was apparently adopted without further
hearings on preemption, although there had been extensive hearings before the earlier language
was drafted. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1298 n.12 (N.D. Cal.
1977), afld per curiam, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 108 (1978). Because
this change was disclosed two weeks before the final vote on ERISA, the legislators had little
time to evaluate its implications for the rest of the lengthy and complex bill. See 30 CoNe.
Q. ALMANAC 252 (1974). In addition, it is unlikely that Congress devoted its complete
attention to the conference reports because they were released within days of the resignation
of President Richard Nixon.
43. See, e.g., S. 4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 609(a), 119 CoNo. REc. 141-42 (1973) (emphasis
added):
It is hereby declared to be the express intent of Congress that . . . the provisions
of this Act or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act shall supersede any and
all laws of the States and political subdivisions thereof insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to the subject matters regulated by this Act or the Welfare and Pen-
sion Plans Disclosure Act ....
See also H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §514(d) (1973) (emphasis added):
It is hereby declared to be the express intent of Congress that the provisions of Titles
11 and III shall supersede any and all laws of the States and of political subdivisions
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to the vesting of participant's benefits In
employee benefit plans, the funding requirements for employee benefit plans or the
adequacy of financing employee benefit plans.
44. Compare note 11 supra with note 43 supra.
45. See H.R. RaP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5038, 5162.
46. This conclusion is reinforced not only by the change made in conference committee,
see notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra, but also by the committee's apparent rejection
of the administration's recommendations regarding preemption. These recommendations in-
cluded limiting federal preemption to specific areas such as participation, funding, vesting, etc.
See Administration Recommendations to the House and Senate Conferees of H.R. 2 to Provide
for Pension Reform, reprinted in 3 SUBcomm. ON LABOR OF Tn SEN. COMM. ON LABOR &
PUBLIc WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 2D SaSS., LEOSsLATIVE HisToRY OF Tan EMPLOYEE RETIIREMEr
INcomE Sacuarr AcT OF 1974, at 5145 (1976).
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ing achievement of this legislation [is] the reservation to Federal authority
[of] the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit plans." "
Senator Jacob Javits, one of the bill's sponsors, indicated that "[c]ompre-
hensive and pervasive federal interest and the interests of uniformity with
respect to interstate plans required-but for certain exceptions-the dis-
placement of State action in the field of private employee benefit programs." 48
The court of appeals in Whaland implicitly acknowledged that the clear
congressional intent to preempt all types of state laws relating to employee
benefit plans was analytically distinct from the unanswered question of
whether indirect state regulation of such plans would be permitted. Relying
on the congressional debates, the court agreed that Congress demonstrated a
broad preemptive intent, but found this intent to extend only to section
514(a) .49  Because of this broad intent, state laws falling under section
514(a) were preempted even if they only tangentially related to employee
benefit plans. Insurance laws, however, were exempted from this section by
section 514(b) (2) (A), and the court reasoned that any conflict between the
sections must be resolved by the deemer clause. 0 The deemer clause, it
concluded, did not prohibit such indirect regulation of employee benefit
plans.5'
II. IMPLICATIONS OF PREEMPTION
A. Impact of Wadsworth v. Whaland
The First Circuit's interpretation of section 514 in Whaland, permitting
indirect regulation of employee welfare plans through the operation of state
insurance laws, has far-reaching implications for the effectiveness of ERISA.
By regulating insurance companies and their agents, a state can exert sub-
stantial control over many aspects of employee welfare plans. 2 States may
47. 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974). Representative Dent, Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, further noted that the conferees
applied the principle of preemption in its "broadest sense to foreclose any non-Federal regula-
tion of employee benefit plans." Id.
48. Id. at 29,942.
49. 562 F.2d at 77. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the major change in
14related to the language that was to become part of § 514(a). See notes 11 & 43 supra.
addition, a review of the congressional debates relating to broad preemption reveals that the
congressmen could only have been referring to § 514(a), because they never explicitly discussed
the very obvious restrictions on preemption found in the rest of § 514. See 120 CoNo. REM.
29,942 (remarks of Sen. Javits); id. at 29,933 (remarks of Sen. Williams); id. at 29,197
(remarks of Rep. Dent).
50. 562 F.2d at 77.
51. Congress never directly addressed this problem in its debates; the court thus relied
on the face of the deemer provision and not on its legislative history. Id. at 78. The court
apparently found the exemption for state insurance laws to be complete except in one
situation-when the state "deemed" a plan to be engaged in the business of insurance and
attempted to regulate it directly. Because no other exception to the exemption was made, the
court concluded that indirect means of regulation were not precluded. Id. at 77-78.
52. Cf. Old Stone Bank v. Michaelson, 439 F. Supp. 252 (D.R.L 1977) (state can insist
on approving benefit plan based on its right to supervise bank activities). Conceivably, under
the Whaland analysis, the state could dictate the types of insureds with whom the insurance
companies can do business and in that way impose certain requirements on the employee
19781 1543
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classify a certain law as an "insurance law," thereby determining whether or
not a state law is preempted by ERISA and creating an additional means of
affecting employee welfare plans. 53  Furthermore, because it is not always
clear whether an employee benefit plan is "deemed" an insurer, or whether
it is simply being indirectly affected by state law, the decision of the court
of appeals invites the continuous litigation that ERISA's sponsors feared.64
The Whaland approach also undermines Congress's attempt to ensure
uniform standards among employee benefit plans.55  If indirect regulation
of employee welfare plans is allowed, fifty sets of requirements may be im-
posed on the national employer who attempts to offer health benefits to his
employees.55 This additional state regulation also contravenes the congres-
sional desire to contain the costs of employee benefit plans so that employers
will not be discouraged from instituting such plans.57 State-imposed require-
ments may increase costs directly-for example, by expanding the scope of
benefits-and indirectly by adding to the administrative costs of complying
with state insurance laws.58
Moreover, the court's decision will encourage employers and plan
trustees to form self-insured plans in order to qualify as insurers and thus
avoid all state regulation. 9 The Whaland court noted that the plans before
it were insureds-not self-insurers-and indicated that if the New Hampshire
statute had attempted to regulate employee welfare plans as insurers, it would
welfare plans. For example, the state may require that insurance companies sell policies only
to insureds who have filed certain information with the state or who comply with certain
fiduciary standards.
53. See 160 PENS. REP. (BNA) A-18 (Oct. 24, 1977) (testimony of Willie R. Barnes,
California Commissioner of Corporations before Oversight Subcomm. of Sen. Comm. on Human
Resources). But see Hewlett-Packard v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1300 (N.D. Cal. 1977),
aff'd per curiam, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 108 (1978) ("The fact that
the state considers employee benefit plans to be a unique variety of insurance . . . makes no
difference under ERISA.").
54. See note 48 and accompanying text supra. For example, this problem might arise if a
state imposed certain requirements on all trustees placing more than $1,000,000 in trust, and
the statute were placed within the state insurance code. The question would be whether the
law is improperly "deeming" the trust fund (which may be used to pay insurance premiums
for employee welfare plans) to be an insurer, or whether it is simply indirectly regulating
employee welfare plans by placing requirements on the plan administrators.
55. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
56. See 189 PENS RaP. (BNA) A-24 (May 22, 1978) (remarks of Deputy Associate
Solicitor of the Department of Labor noting that if plan relies on insurance companies to
provide benefits, uniform national benefits will be impossible). Appellants in Whaland claimed
that the New Hampshire law was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce because
plan administrators were required to be fair and equal in the administration of the plan funds,
and chapter 57 might conflict with jurisdictions having different insurance requirements. The
court summarily rejected this argument.
57. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 4890, 4904: "[S]ince these plans are voluntary on the part of the
employer and both the institution of new pension plans and increases in benefits depend upon
employer willingness to participate . . . it is necessary to take into account additional costs
from the standpoint of the employer."
58. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the ERISA Regulations Industry Committee [ERIC] at
30-31, Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977) (estimating that the cost impact of
state law on employee plans is at least five percent for administration expenses alone).
59. See note 16 supra. See also Brummond, supra note 4, at 100.
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clearly be preempted by section 514(b) (2) (B).160 Thus, New Hampshire
now requires plans obtaining insurance policies from private companies to
purchase mental health coverage, while self-insured plans are not-and under
ERISA cannot be-held to such an obligation. It seems unlikely that Con-
gress intended that some plans be indirectly subject to state laws, while other
plans are exempt purely on the basis of the form of risk allocation that they
choose61-but this is precisely the result which the Whaland analysis yields.
B. Alternatives to the First Circuit Approach
In ERISA, Congress established a Pension Task Force to deal with the
problems created by preemption.62 Statutory changes responsive to the
questions raised by section 514 are now widely expected.68 Analysis of the
problems raised by the court of appeals' approach in Whaland indicates
that there are some alternatives available that involve little or no change in
the statutory scheme. These solutions seem to simplify the problems of
preemption, while promoting the congressional goals of reasonable cost, uni-
formity, and avoidance of litigation.
1. Statutory Reform. The simplest response to the problems raised by
section 514 would be to amend that section so that preemption applies to
employee pension plans but not to employee welfare plans.6 4 Such a result
would allow federal dominance of pension regulation to continue intact-a
desirable result since there has been little trouble with section 514 in the
pension context.65 Unfortunately, preempting only state regulation of em-
ployee pension plans would not solve the problems that precipitated enact-
ment of ERISA. Concurrent state and federal regulation of employee wel-
fare plans would remain, and many of the same problems found in the
Whaland approach, including extra costs and lack of national uniformity,66
would persist.
60. 562 F.2d at 76. Since §514(b)(2)(B) provides that any state insurance law that
"deems" a plan to be an insurer or insurance company is preempted (and since any other state
regulation of employee welfare plans is preempted under the general language of § 514(a)),
the benefit requirements of the New Hampshire statute clearly could not be imposed on a
self-insuring plan.
61. This problem is compounded by the fact that employers unable to afford the insurance
requirements imposed by state law are more likely to self-insure, although they are less able to
bear the financial costs of doing so. 160 PENS. Rm'. (BNA) A-16 (Oct. 24, 1977) (testimony
of ERIC representative Robert S. Stone before Oversight Subcomm. of Sen. Comm. on Human
Resources).
62. See ERISA § 3022(a) (4), 29 U.S.C. § 1222(a) (4) (1975).
63. See, e.g., 198 PENS. REP. (BNA) A-33 (July 24, 1978); 151 Pms. REP. (BNA) A-3
Aug. 22, 1977); 149 PENS. REP. (BNA) A-17 (Aug. 8, 1977); 134 PENs. REP. (BNA) A-17
(Apr. 25, 1977).
64. See Brummond,, supra note 4, at 124; 160 PENs. REP. (BNA) A-19 (Oct. 24, 1977),
illustrating the ways in which § 514 could be altered to preserve preemption of the state laws
relating to employee pension plans, while explicitly negating the possibility that state laws are
superseded in the employee welfare plan area.
65. Although many states attempted to regulate employee welfare plans, only a few had
enacted laws regulating pensions, and most of these laws were not as comprehensive as ERISA.
Brummond, supra note 4, at 114. Because state regulation of welfare plans was more highly
developed, the need for total preemption was less compelling, and the resultant disruption of
the state regulatory scheme was more extensive than has been the case with pension plans.
66. See notes 5 & 57 and accompanying text supra.
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A more satisfactory approach would be to amend ERISA so that the
Act, as a whole, no longer applies to employee welfare plans. 7 By removing
the partial federal regulation in this area, such an approach would eliminate
the preemption confusion concerning employee welfare plans, 8 while neither
reintroducing the Whaland problems69 nor undercutting the thrust of Con-
gress's efforts in the area of pension plan regulation." Congress could then
consider enacting new, comprehensive legislation focusing exclusively on the
needs of employee welfare plans.71
2. Alternative Judicial Interpretations of Section 514. Absent the
statutory changes suggested above, the problems raised by the court of ap-
peals' approach in Whaland could be remedied by any one of several alterna-
tive constructions of section 514. If the provision were read as preempting
all state laws, including insurance laws, that indirectly regulate employee
benefit plans,72 the problems of continuous litigation and lack of national
uniformity would not arise. Congress could then require, through amend-
ments to ERISA, that certain minimum benefits be provided,78 and thereby
monitor the costs of employee welfare plans, while ensuring that certain
basic benefits are provided. Alternatively, Congress could ensure that costs
will not be prohibitive by allowing the employer74 or employee organization
establishing a plan to determine the benefits to be provided. 7
67. This might be done simply by deleting all references to employee welfare plans from
titles I and M of the Act.
68. A strong argument can be made for this approach in light of the fact that the
substance of ERISA reflects a lack of careful congressional consideration of the implications
of preemption of state laws relating to employee welfare plans. See Brummond, supra note 4,
at 117.
69. See notes 52-61 and accompanying text supra.
70. A review of the Congressional hearings preceding ERISA reveals that Congress was
primarily concerned with remedying abuses found in the employee pension plan area, and the
statute itself reflects that emphasis. Thus, titles H and IV are totally inapplicable to welfare
plans, as are parts two and three of title L See note 4 supra. The name of the Act, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 is also indicative of Congress's primary
concern.
71. Congress's inattention to the peculiar needs of employee welfare plans resulted in
serious inadequacies in the present regulatory scheme. In addition to the failure of ERISA to
provide guarantees that a welfare plan will meet its obligations, it does not specifically provide
for the establishment of these plans or for sufficiently detailed reporting. ERISA also fails to
provide guidance concerning the type of benefits that should be included in employee benefit
plans, or who is to decide the extent of these plans. For a discussion of other inadequacies,
see Brummond, supra note 4, at 117-8; 184 PENs. REP. (BNA) A-13 (April 17, 1978)
(remarks of Willie R. Barnes).
72. See notes 34-36 and accompanying text supra.
73. For example, Congress might adopt part of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) model comprehensive health legislation, which provides that employers
must provide group insurance coverage that meets certain minimum standards. See NAIC
MoDEL CoMPREnENsIvE HEALTH INSUANcE AND HEALTH CARE COST CorAINmr Acr § 5,
reprinted in 2 NATIONAL AssocIATIoN OF INsURANCE COMMISSIONERS, PROCEEDINGS 410 (1976).
This type of legislation would require considerable research, since ERISA's legislative history
suggests that Congress has not given the subject any consideration.
74. Cf. Standard Oil v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (finding some
evidence that Congress intended that the private sector, rather than the federal government,
determine the benefits to be included in employee welfare plans).
75. ERISA-governed plans may be set up by an employer and an employee organization
acting together. See note 3 supra. In such cases, the types of benefits provided may be
mandatory subjects of bargaining in the collective bargaining context, See National Labor
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Total preemption, including preemption of insurance laws indirectly
regulating employee welfare plans, raises serious problems, however. States
would have great difficulty regulating insurance companies at all because the
same agents, policies, and funds used on employee welfare plans would be
used on other insureds.7 In addition, states would be limited in the extent
to which they could initiate progressive legislation to protect employees. 7
More broadly, total preemption would exempt from state regulation many
activities that are only tangentially related to the employee welfare plans.
For example, MISA, if broadly construed, would preempt laws governing
community property, sex discrimination, and other areas never considered by
Congress when enacting the statute.78
The greatest single problem with sweeping preemption is that it would
create a vast regulatory vacuum in the area of employee welfare plans.79 In
contrast to the limited provisions for fiduciary and disclosure requirements
provided by ERISA, state regulation of welfare plans is comprehensive,
particularly in the area of financial stability.80 Removing the states' presence
in this field would force courts, absent a broad congressional initiative, to
undertake the burdensome task of formulating a federal common law to fill
the regulatory vacuum.81 Furthermore, even if Congress devised a compre-
hensive statutory scheme, the task of supervising the numerous plans would
be staggering.82
A preferable solution, implicitly suggested by the district court de-
Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). For a discussion of the complex interrelation
of federal labor law and state-imposed employee benefit requirements, see White Motor Corp.
v. Malone, 545 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
76. See Brummond, supra note 4, at 118-19 (discussing the problems of regulating "half a
company").
77. See 184 PErs. RaP. (BNA) A-13 (Apr. 17, 1978) (preemption of state health insur-
ance laws has stymied states' abilities to create new and unique health provisions).
78. See Pattiz, rn a Divorce or Dissolution Who Gets the Pension Rights: Domestic
Relations Lm and Retirement Plans, 5 PEPPERDn E L. REV. 191, 231 n.181 (1978); 160 PENs.
REP. (BNA) A-17, 18 (Oct. 24, 1977). Cf. Time Ins. Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor &
Human Relations, No. 154-423 (Circuit Court, Dane County, Wis., filed Jan. 3, 1978)
(considering the applicability of state anti-discrimination law to employee welfare plan). See
also Kerbow v. Kerbow, 421 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (seeking to compel plan to
withhold ERISA-governed pension payments awarded to spouse in divorce settlement); In re
Marriage of Pardee, 408 F. Supp. 666, 669 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (intent to regulate pension
plans does not necessarily include intent to control state's distribution of assets in divorce
proceedings).
79. See note 71 supra.
80. See Brummond, supra note 4, at 118. See also CAL. HEALTH & SAETY CODE §§ 1340-
1399.5 (West 1977) (held preempted by ERISA in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 571 F.2d
502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 108 (1978)); HAw.u REV. STAT. §§ 393-1 to -51 (1976)(held preempted in Standard Oil v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977)); IDAHo
CODB §§41-4003(1), 41-4004(1) (1977).
81. See, e.g., In re C.). Moyer Co. Trust Fund, 441 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316 (Ni.D. Ind.), aff'd on
other grounds, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977). The courts' conclusion that a federal common
law should be formulated was based on legislative history indicating that the courts are to
fashion a federal common law as they do for the Labor Management Relations Act. See
120 CoNe. REc. 29,942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
82. See Brummond, supra note 4, at 119; 191 PmNs. REP. (BNA) A-16, A-17 (June 5,
1978) (testimony of Herbert W. Anderson). Brummond points out that the number of
employee welfare plans affected would be unmanageable given the size of the Department of
Labor's staff. Supervision would be further hindered because it would be organized through
the Department on a regional, rather than local basis.
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cision in Whaland, is to interpret ERISA's preemption provisions as dis-
placing state laws only in those areas that the Act specifically regulates.8
This approach, which has been used by a few other district courts,8 4 avoids
creating the regulatory vacuum that follows broader preemption. It differs
from the court of appeals' approach in that it requires courts to determine
whether Congress sought to regulate the activity before they decide whether
the state insurance laws are preempted, 85 rather than establishing the rule
that state insurance regulation of any entity other than an employee welfare
plan is allowed.
Analysis under this approach begins by asking whether the state law
relates to employee welfare plans, 86 and if it does, 7 if the law is one govern-
ing insurance.8 8 If the answer is again affirmative, the inquiry turns to
whether the state law regulates an area covered by titles I or IV of ERISA.
If it does not, the state law may operate, even if it directly regulates em-
ployee welfare plans. This approach results in loss of some federal uni-
formity of regulation. The problem of encouraging self-insurance is avoided,
however, because states can directly regulate some aspects of all employee
welfare plans without the subterfuge of claiming to be regulating insurance
companies. The regulatory vacuum is also avoided, and though there may
be some litigation over whether a state law regulates disclosure or fiduciary
standards, the issues seem much more clearcut than those raised by the court
in Whaland.89
83. See note 21 and accompanying text supra. The district court noted that the legislative
history of ERISA did not address the issue of preemption of substantive insurance statutes,
and that the intent of ERISA was to deal with reporting and funding requirements of
employee benefit plans and not with the regulation of insurance. Dawson v. Whaland, No.
76-266 (D.N.H. Feb. 11, 1977) (available on Lexis).
84. See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.) (dictum), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 108 (1978); Insurers' Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. 921
(D. Minn. 1976). In refusing to find preemption of the Minnesota Comprehensive Insurance
Act, the Heaton court noted that BRISA imposes only reporting and disclosure duties on
welfare plans, and held that, since this has "nothing to do with the substance of the insurance
plans which employers must offer their employees,' it is not preemptive. Id. at 926.
85. In Whaland, the court of appeals looked at the regulation of the benefit plan qua
plan, and was seemingly unconcerned with the impact of state law on the plan as long as it
was not directly aimed at employee welfare plans. The proposed approach provides that both
direct and indirect regulation of employee welfare plans would be preempted if Congress has
legislated regarding a particular aspect of the plans. This latter approach ensures that plans
are not at all affected by state regulation if Congress has legislated in the area.
86. It has been suggested that the "relating to" language should be changed to "regulate."
See 160 PiNs. RaP. (BNA) A-19 (Oct. 24, 1977) (testimony before the Labor Subcommittee
of the Senate Human Resources Comm.). This change would have the further effect of limiting
preemption of state laws by focusing squarely on those laws that regulate employee welfare
plans.
87. If the state law does not relate to employee welfare plans, it does not fall within the
ambit of § 514(a) and is not governed by ERISA.
88. If the question of whether the law is an insurance law is answered in the negative,
the state law comes squarely within § 514(a) and is preempted. Presumably, state laws that do
not regulate insurance but do relate to employee welfare plans could include laws governing
such areas as divorce, inheritance, and tort. This illustrates the need for adopting the proposal
described at note 86 supra, because it eliminates the possibility of preempting state laws only
tangentially relating to employee welfare plans.
89. For instance, it seems easier to answer the question of what is a disclosure statute
than to engage in the inquiry of whether the statute really regulates insurance companies or
whether it is a veiled attempt to directly regulate employee welfare plans. See note 54 supra.
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CONCLUSION
Section 514 of ERISA does not lend itself to easy conclusions about
what Congress intended in the area of employee welfare plans. The decision
of the court of appeals in Wadsworth v. Whaland represents a plausible in-
terpretation of the language of the statute, but its conclusion creates serious
problems for future courts and plan administrators, not only because it
allows'extensive indirect state regulation of employee welfare plans, but also
because it encourages plans to become self-insurers to avoid state regulation.
A better judicial resolution would be to read ERISA to require preemption
of state laws only to the extent that the Act explicitly regulates various
aspects of the employee welfare plan area. This solution does not focus on
whether employee welfare plans are being directly or indirectly affected, but
instead considers the more important question of whether Congress actually
intended to regulate a particular aspect of these plans.
Leslie C. Levin
